Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 94 | Issue 5

Article 2

7-2019

State Standing and Cooperative Federalism
Ernest A. Young
Duke Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons
Recommended Citation
94 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1893 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre
Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

16-JUL-19

7:54

STATE STANDING AND COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM
Ernest A. Young*
States increasingly litigate before the federal courts in lawsuits challenging national policy. Texas Attorney General (now Governor) Greg Abbott is
famous for describing his typical day as follows: “I go into the office, I sue the
federal government and I go home.”1 Although the challenges over the last
decade tended to come from the political right—including litigation over
national healthcare, immigration, and discrimination policy—high-profile
lawsuits have come from the political left as well. The leading Supreme
Court decision on state litigation, Massachusetts v. EPA,2 involved an effort by
Massachusetts and eleven other States to force the Bush-era Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act. And states have been the lead plaintiffs in recent challenges to Presi-

© 2019 Ernest A. Young. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. Many of the ideas in this Essay
originated in a brief that I filed on behalf of a group of federal courts scholars as well as
the Southeastern Legal Foundation in the Texas immigration case. See Brief of Amici
Curiae Federal Courts Scholars and Southeastern Legal Foundation in Support of
Respondents, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) [hereinafter
Brief of Federal Courts Scholars]. This Essay ranges considerably beyond that filing,
however, and so nothing I say here should necessarily be imputed to the Foundation or the
other signatories of that brief. I have also participated as amicus supporting Massachusetts’
standing to challenge the Trump administration’s expanded religious and moral
exemptions to the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate. See Brief of Professor
Ernest A. Young as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Urging Reversal,
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 18-1514 (1st Cir., Sept. 24,
2018), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3905/. I am grateful to the
Notre Dame Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this Symposium, and to Lauren
Jackson, Colleen O’Leary, and Mark Rothrock for excellent research assistance.
1 Sue Owen, Greg Abbott Says He Has Sued Obama Administration 25 Times, POLITIFACT
(May 10, 2013), http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2013/may/10/greg-abbott/
greg-abbott-says-he-has-sued-obama-administration-/.
2 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
1893

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

1894

unknown

Seq: 2

notre dame law review

16-JUL-19

7:54

[vol. 94:5

dent Trump’s executive orders restricting entry into the United States for
persons from select countries.3
State lawsuits challenging federal policy generally encounter arguments
that the states lack standing to sue, either under Article III’s “case or controversy” clause or under various prudential standing doctrines.4 These arguments have often taken novel forms—such as claims that states’ injuries are
“self-inflicted” or offset by other benefits of federal policies—that have few
precedents or analogs in the standing jurisprudence governing suits by private individuals. The United States has taken the position, in other words,
that states should have special disabilities in filing lawsuits that would not
apply to ordinary litigants. Likewise, prominent academics have argued that
uniquely narrow standing rules should govern states.5 States frequently
respond by arguing that their unique status as state governments confers special advantages when it comes to standing. In particular, they have relied
upon the parens patriae doctrine, which allows them (sometimes) to sue to
redress injuries to their citizens, or simply invoked Massachusetts v. EPA’s
statement that states are entitled to “special solicitude” in standing analysis.6
Undergirding all of this doctrinal conflict is a broader worry that litigation between states and the national government is an inherently political
enterprise. My colleague Walter Dellinger, formerly acting Solicitor General
during the Clinton administration, argued that recognizing state standing to
challenge the Obama administration “would open wide a back door to federal court for States seeking resolution of a host of politically charged disputes.”7 The claim seems to be that because states are themselves public and
political actors, litigation by them against the national government is inher-

3 Washington, Minnesota, and Virginia challenged the original travel ban in January
of 2017. See Mark Dayton, Judge Temporarily Halts Trump Travel Ban After Lawsuit from Wash.,
Minn., CBS MINN. (Feb. 3, 2017), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2017/02/03/states-seekhalt-trump-travel-ban/; Amanda Iacone, Virginia Joins Suit Challenging Trump’s Immigration
Order, WTOP (Jan. 31, 2017), http://wtop.com/virginia/2017/01/virginia-sues-trumpadministration-over-immigration-order/. Seventeen additional states and the District of
Columbia joined an amicus brief supporting Washington and Minnesota. See Brief of the
States of Pennsylvania et al., and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae States in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 1735105) 2017 WL 564203.
4 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 340 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2018)
(denying three states standing to challenge changes to the federal student loan forgiveness
program).
5 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Reining in State Standing, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2015 (2019) [hereinafter Woolhandler & Collins, Reining].
6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520.
7 See Brief for Professor Walter Dellinger as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 4, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), http://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6283&context=faculty_scholarship [hereinafter
Dellinger Brief].
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ently “political” in some way that litigation by ordinary private litigants is
not.8
My own view is considerably more sympathetic to state standing. The
general issue divides naturally into three distinct questions. First, when will
states have standing to sue the national government under “ordinary” principles of standing law—that is, without any thumb on the scale, one way or the
other, arising from their status as state governments? Part I answers this
question by arguing that, even under ordinary standing principles, the
responsibilities and prerogatives of state governments give them a broad
range of interests that may be invaded or harmed by national action. In particular, the structure of modern cooperative federalism regimes—in which
state governments typically work hand in glove with federal officials administering statutes like Medicaid or the Clean Air Act—mean that changes in
federal policy will almost always meaningfully affect state interests. And even
where federal regulation is not formally cooperative—as in immigration policy—the role of the states in policing and ensuring the well-being of persons
within their jurisdictions will often cause federal policy changes to significantly impact states’ responsibilities. States are thus likely to enjoy broad
standing even under ordinary Article III analysis.
The second question is whether states should have special disadvantages,
unique to them, when they seek to establish standing to sue. Part II demonstrates that many standing arguments made against state litigation would not
fly—and would never be raised—in litigation brought by private parties.
Such arguments can be defended only on the ground that states should be
uniquely disabled from challenging federal action. The best case for such
disabilities rests on the notion that state litigation is inherently political and,
therefore, should be nonjusticiable. But the political question doctrine has
generally turned on the nature of the substantive claims being advanced, not
the identity of the parties. And in any event, state litigation must be compared to its alternatives, not evaluated in a vacuum. I argue that hot-button
political issues will be litigated by private organizations, class actions, and
other mechanisms if not by states, and that states may compare favorably to
private suits in important respects. The other alternative is to resolve these
high-profile disputes outside the courts through political remedies. But
recent experience suggests that such remedies—which include government
shutdowns, refusals to confirm executive appointments, and even impeachment—are not necessarily preferable to litigation. In our polarized contemporary circumstances, it is time to reexamine our customary aversion to
settling political questions in courts of law, as long as those questions are in
fact governed by positive law.
The last question points in the opposite direction: Should states have
special advantages in establishing standing? Part III suggests that the “special
solicitude” recognized in Massachusetts v. EPA is actually narrower than is
8 See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2031 (suggesting that state
public litigation inappropriately seeks to have courts adjudicate “policy disputes between
governments”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

1896

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

16-JUL-19

7:54

[vol. 94:5

sometimes supposed. But I do argue that that state-based litigation provides
a means of aggregating the interests of large numbers of individual persons
and as such should be viewed as a potential alternative to class actions, multidistrict litigation, or broad organizational standing for nongovernmental
entities like the Sierra Club. Viewed in this framework, state litigation has
much to recommend it. Like any legal mechanism, state litigation can be—
and perhaps has been—abused in particular cases. But the institutional and
political checks and balances built into state litigation give reason to hope
that it can be a positive component of our constitutional structure.
I. STATE INTERESTS

AND

INJURIES

Article III’s basic requirement for standing is both familiar and superficially simple: litigants must establish a concrete “injury in fact,” caused by the
challenged action and redressable by the requested relief.9 The nature of
the required injury, however, has proven elusive in practice. It is plainly, at
least in part, a function of the underlying right that the plaintiff is asserting.10 Taxpayers, for example, ordinarily lack standing to challenge federal
programs involving expenditure of their tax dollars, but taxpayers may often
assert claims under the Establishment Clause.11 Standing is also partially a
function of the identity of the party asserting that right. Third parties, for
example, will have standing to assert the rights of others depending on their
relationship with those others.12 Moreover, the interests creating standing
may arise from either federal or state law. If government action damages an
individual’s personal or real property, for example, the relevant property
rights will generally be creatures of state law;13 similarly, state referendum
proponents’ ability to defend their measure on appeal has depended on the
degree to which state law empowers them to litigate state interests.14 Differ9 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). See generally RICHH. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 101–32 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
10 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24
(1988).
11 Compare Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denying taxpayer standing to
challenge a federal program that allegedly exceeded Congress’s Article I powers), with
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (permitting a taxpayer to challenge the expenditure of
federal funds to support religious schools). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at
127–29 (discussing the taxpayer standing cases).
12 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (denying divorced father’s standing to challenge a public
school’s requirement that his daughter recite the Pledge of Allegiance on the ground that,
under state law, he was not the custodial parent).
13 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, of
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law . . . .”).
14 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013).
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ent parties have different legal interests, the invasion of which can support
standing under Article III.
States are large governmental entities with extensive responsibilities.
Some of their interests are the same sorts of interests that private parties
might assert—injuries to state property or breaches of state contracts, for
example. Other interests arise from the states’ uniquely governmental
responsibilities, but they are not qualitatively different from private interests.
An individual prevented by government regulation from doing something he
is otherwise entitled to do will generally have standing to challenge that regulation, and a state prevented from exercising its ordinary prerogatives is in no
different position—even if those prerogatives are public rather than private
duties. The fact that states have broader prerogatives and responsibilities
than most entities may give them standing in an unusually broad range of
cases, but so does the fact that states own more property and enter into more
contracts than most entities.
To say that state governments are likely to have broad standing based on
their broad set of interests is not to propose any sort of “special” standing
rule for state litigants. There may be reasons to recognize special standing
rules for states in certain circumstances, as I discuss in Part III. But in many,
if not most, cases the states’ broad access to federal court is simply the result
of applying standard standing doctrine to these litigants. As Professors Ann
Woolhandler and Michael Collins acknowledge, “[t]he problem is not that
states lack real injuries . . . . The problem [for opponents of state standing] is
that states can easily satisfy the current standing tests.”15
A. Common Interests of States
States have many of the same interests that private parties do, and in
many cases state litigation will look a great deal like private lawsuits.16 States
own property, for example, and they enter into contracts. In its leading
Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez decision,17 the Supreme
Court classified these interests as “proprietary” in nature, noting that “[a]s a
proprietor, it is likely to have the same interests as other similarly situated
proprietors. And like other such proprietors it may at times need to pursue
those interests in court.”18 When states suffer injuries to these sorts of interests, they have no trouble establishing their standing to sue.19
One could wish for a better term than “proprietary” to describe these
sorts of interests. The distinction between proprietary and governmental
interests and actions is notoriously indeterminate, and the Supreme Court
has tended to discard it in contexts where it had to bear any significant
15 Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2024.
16 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 109–10 (2018).
17 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
18 Id. at 601–02.
19 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387,
406–07 (1995).
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weight.20 Two more specific problems undermine its usefulness for purposes
of defining the interests of states in litigation. First, the term tends to disguise the extent to which these common interests can support litigation in
the field of public law. And second, proprietary interests in property or contractual rights are hardly the only interests that states share in common with
private entities.
Even narrowly understood proprietary interests may support important
forms of public-law litigation against the national government.21 For
instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA,22 the Bay State and several other state governments sought to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act.23 Although the Supreme Court’s ruling on standing relied
importantly on the Commonwealth’s sovereign interests, the Court noted that
“Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be
affected’ ” by climate change.24 Likewise, state contractual interests include
not only contracts with private individuals and businesses but also federal
grants-in-aid programs whereby states agree to participate in the implementation of federal programs in exchange for federal funds.25 States challenging
federal decisions concerning those programs thus may often assert contractual interests as a basis for standing.26 Much federal regulatory policy operates through such programs, and state litigation challenging federal
adherence to the programs’ statutory terms may thus have broad public
significance.
Common interests that states share with private individuals and other
nongovernmental entities include not only property and contractual rights
but also interests in preventing unlawful interference with one’s lawful freedom of action. If the President decided to reimpose the fifty-five miles per
hour speed limit on the nation’s highways by executive order, any driver sub20 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543 (1985) (“The
distinction [between ‘governmental’ and ‘proprietary’ functions] the Court discarded as
unworkable in the field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause.”).
21 See generally Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 370 (2018) (“[S]tates are well-positioned to allege private law harms even as they pursue public law claims.”).
22 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
23 See id. at 505.
24 Id. at 519. It is hard to tell whether Massachusetts could have established standing
based on this ownership interest alone. The real difficulty with Massachusetts’s claim for
standing involved the causation elements of standing. Because the causes of climate
change are so multifarious and the likelihood that any given regulatory change would
redress it is so murky, Massachusetts may have required “special solicitude” to get it over
the causation hump. See infra Part III. But the Commonwealth’s ownership interest
should have been sufficient to support the requisite injury in fact.
25 See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(describing spending-power legislation as contracts between the federal and state governments); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (same).
26 See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) (suit to recover funds wrongfully withheld by federal authorities under federal Medicaid program).
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ject to that speed limit would have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the
order as a constraint on his otherwise-legal activities.27 He would not have to
assert some special “right” to drive fast; it would be enough that something
that was previously lawful for him to do had been rendered unlawful, and
that the means for doing so was arguably counter to the Constitution’s specified lawmaking criteria. And if the President’s order applied the same speed
limit to law enforcement vehicles, the North Carolina Highway Patrol would
have standing to assert the same claim on precisely the same ground. Likewise, if Congress mandated a national educational curriculum for primary
school children, both private and public schools would have standing to challenge that law as exceeding Congress’s enumerated powers on the ground
that it unlawfully constrained their freedom of action by requiring them to
teach things they didn’t want to teach.
To be sure, the states’ interests in such cases are governmental interests
in that a government has them, and the freedom of action in question is the
freedom to do things that governments do. But many state functions—such
as driving or teaching—are functions that both public and private entities
engage in. And even government activities that lack private analogs still
implicate the same principle—one is injured when unlawfully prevented
from doing something one is otherwise lawfully entitled to do—that grounds
private standing in a wide range of cases. This autonomy interest is no less
common to public and private entities than property and contractual interests are. For that reason, I submit that it is more helpful to speak of “common” than of “proprietary” interests.
Critical state interests typically characterized as “sovereign” or uniquely
governmental are hard to distinguish in principle from private interests in
freedom of action. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, for example, the Court
considered a claim by a public interest organization, Housing Opportunities
Made Equal (HOME), against a realtor for engaging in racial steering in violation of the Fair Housing Act.28 The Court held HOME to have standing in
its own right—and not simply as a representative of its members—based on
allegations that the defendant’s practices “have perceptibly impaired
HOME’s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers.”29 According to the Court, “[s]uch concrete and
demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent
drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a
setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”30 The defendant’s
actions, in other words, made it more difficult for HOME to carry out its
27 The real fifty-five miles per hour speed limit was adopted as part of the federal
Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(b)(1), 87 Stat. 1046,
1046 (1974), a federal statute that conditioned federal highway funds to state governments
on the states’ lowering of their speed limits.
28 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
29 Id. at 379.
30 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

1900

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

16-JUL-19

7:54

[vol. 94:5

organizational mission, and hence “there can be no question that the organization has suffered injury in fact.”31
Havens Realty seems readily comparable to the interests asserted by Texas
in its challenge to the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) policy, which significantly expanded the number of undocumented aliens who would be considered “legally present” in the United States.32 Texas’s narrow argument for
standing was that Texas law requires the Department of Public Safety to issue
driver’s licenses to everyone who is lawfully present in the state. The fees
don’t cover the full cost to the state, so that the state is out about $100 for
each person who applies for a license. Texas argued that if millions of additional persons were deemed to be lawfully present in Texas under the federal
DAPA program, it would be injured by having to subsidize a large number of
driver’s licenses.
On its face, this pecuniary injury ought to be a no-brainer for standing—
after all, “economic injury is one of [the] paradigmatic forms” of injury in
fact.33 But it is equally important to recognize that Texas’s driver’s license
argument was simply a particularly concrete example of DAPA’s broader
impact upon the state’s activities. States have to govern—that is, they’re
responsible for looking after all the people in their jurisdiction.34 They do
this in a wide variety of ways—protecting them from crime, educating their
children, and, sometimes, issuing them driver’s licenses. Looking after people is expensive, and when federal action increased the number of people a
state has to take care of, that put pressure on Texas’s governmental mission
in much the same way that the discriminatory practices in Havens Realty put
pressure on the housing rights organization.
Current challenges to the Trump administration’s new rules permitting
religious and moral exemptions from the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
mandate provide a similar example. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
has argued that, under its existing laws, it will be required to make up gaps in
employees’ coverage for contraceptive expenses should their employers opt
out of providing that coverage under the new rules.35 The district court held
31 Id.; see Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005)
(Alito, J.) (citing Havens Realty as an example of a “paradigmatic” injury in fact sufficient
for standing).
32 See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 606, 678 (S.D. Tex.) (enjoining the
injunction of the DAPA program and DACA program expansion), aff’d, 787 F.3d 733 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271,
2272 (2016).
33 Danvers Motor Co., 432 F.3d at 291.
34 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(observing that states have an “easily identified” “sovereign interest[ ]” in “the exercise of
sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction”).
35 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F. Supp. 3d 248 (D.
Mass. 2018), vacated, 923 F.3d 209 (1st Cir. 2019). Pennsylvania and California have filed
similar challenges. See California v. Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D.
Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 9

state standing and cooperative federalism

16-JUL-19

7:54

1901

that Massachusetts lacked standing—erroneously, in this author’s view36—
because the Commonwealth had failed to establish with certainty how many
employers would, in fact, avail themselves of the new opportunity to opt
out.37 But the court did not question that, if Massachusetts could in fact
prove it would incur expenses in serving its population as a result of the new
federal rule, those expenses would count as a valid injury in fact for standing
purposes.
Neither of these claims to standing turns on an assertion that Texas had
any “right” to control the number of people coming into its jurisdiction, or
that Massachusetts had a right to have the federal government subsidize contraceptives for employees. Both states were obliged to show that their legitimate interests had been adversely impacted by an unlawful exercise of
federal power. In each case, the primary claim was not that the federal policy
in question could never be adopted, but rather that it had unlawfully been
adopted through unilateral executive action or without respecting the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). As I discuss
in the next Section, both of these claims do implicate foundational interests
of the states in our contemporary political system. The critical point for present purposes, though, is that state claims raising those interests can often
rest on concrete injuries closely analogous to those supporting claims by private parties.
Those analogies can hold even where the injury is not pecuniary in
nature. The Supreme Court’s decision in Snapp recognized a “sovereign”
interest in “both [a] civil and criminal” legal code.38 This is presumably the
interest that supports a government’s standing to bring criminal prosecutions; likewise, it supports a state government’s standing to appeal when it is
enjoined or otherwise prevented from enforcing its laws.39 But this interest, I
submit, is simply a variant of the more general principle that a cognizable
injury occurs whenever a person or entity is prevented from doing something
that they are otherwise lawfully entitled to do.40 A state government that
558 (9th Cir. 2018); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 18-1253 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2018).
36 See generally Brief of Professor Ernest A. Young as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Urging Reversal, supra note *.
37 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F. Supp. 3d 248. The Ninth Circuit and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by contrast, accepted a similar standing argument in
the California and Pennsylvania cases. See Azar, 911 F.3d at 571–73; California v. Health &
Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d at 567–69.
38 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
39 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting a state government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidating a state law because “a State clearly has a legitimate
interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”); see also Kathryn A. Watts &
Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global
Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 7 (2007) (noting that “the state . . . has a sovereign interest in preserving its own law” that “should be sufficient for Article III purposes”).
40 One important qualification is that the injury must still be “imminent.” Any aspiring plaintiff must still show that she is being constrained from doing something that she is
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prohibited recreational marijuana use, for example, would have standing to
challenge a federal statute purporting to legalize such use because that statute would constrain the state from enforcing a law that it was otherwise lawfully entitled to enforce. This interest is not fundamentally different from a
private employer’s interest in defending a policy of not hiring persons using
marijuana by challenging a state law prohibiting that practice.41
Even a state’s “quasi-sovereign” interest in redressing injuries to its citizens is not intrinsically different from interests frequently and uncontroversially asserted by private parties. As my colleague, Katherine Mims Crocker,
points out in this Symposium,42 states asserting such claims are closely analogous to private associations that bring suit on behalf of their members. If the
Sierra Club may establish organizational standing based on its members’
interests in enjoying the environment,43 then surely California may assert the
similar interests of its members—that is, its citizens. As I discuss further
below,44 the question is not simply whether states should be able to sue on
behalf of their citizens, but rather how state suits compare to other likely
vehicles for aggregating diffuse claims.
Nothing I have said here would meaningfully expand the law of standing. But that law as it bears on state litigants has become bogged down in
distinctions between sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and proprietary interests.
These terms may well be helpful in describing the different sorts of interests
that state governments often assert. But these categories may overlap in
important ways, and they are not fundamentally different from the sorts of
interests that support suits by private actors. In most situations, we should
treat state governments as no different in principle from private litigants.
Because they are states, of course, state litigants engage in a broader range of
activities than most plaintiffs. But as I discuss in Part II below, the burden
should be on opponents of state standing to explain why those differences
are relevant to the basic principles of Article III.
actually likely to do. Your fundamentally sedentary author would likely lack standing to
challenge a government prohibition on running marathons. One might alternately state
this limit as a function of ripeness: one lacks standing to challenge a law until one is actually—or imminently will be—affected by its requirements. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Hence, a state that had enacted no laws governing, say, data
privacy might find itself unable to challenge a federal law preempting that field, at least
until it could show that the federal law was preventing a live legislative proposal from being
enacted.
41 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.32(3)(c) (West 2018) (prohibiting employers from
discriminating against medical marijuana users).
42 Katherine Mims Crocker, An Organizational Account of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2057 (2019) [hereinafter Crocker, Organizational Account]; see also Lemos & Young,
supra note 16, at 111–12.
43 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972). The trouble in Morton was that
the Sierra Club had alleged no individualized harms to its members. But states’ parens
patriae claims typically do allege such harms. See, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 (recognizing
Puerto Rico’s right to sue parens patriae to redress employment discrimination against its
residents).
44 See infra Section II.C.
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B. Cooperative Federalism and States’ Interest in Separation of Powers
Some critics have suggested that states should have standing to assert
only limited classes of interests and arguments uniquely related to their status
in our federal system. Professor Tara Grove, for example, has argued that
“[s]tates have broad standing to protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.”45 This Section offers two related answers to
that way of thinking. First, because of changes to the structure of American
federalism over the last century, changes in federal law pervasively affect state
governments, which frequently act as partners with federal officials in implementing federal regulatory and benefit schemes. Because of this, one generally need not rely on special or broad notions of state standing to find states
have an interest in challenging unlawful changes to federal policy. Second,
constitutional categories like federalism, separation of powers, or individual
rights are not so readily separated—and they should not be artificially walled
off for standing analysis. States frequently have significant interests at stake
in separation of powers cases, for example.46 It is thus not only artificial but
corrosive of the constitutional scheme to limit states to litigating particular
categories of claims.
Snapp recognized “a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.”47 This is not simply
an interest in being denied, say, sovereign rights protected by the “equal footing” doctrine. Rather, it includes “securing observance of the terms under
which [the state] participates in the federal system.”48 Those terms, however,
have changed considerably since the Founding. Under the “dual federalism”
model that dominated American law and governance for much of our history, the national and state governments operated largely in separate and
exclusive spheres of authority.49 The national government handled foreign
affairs, for example, while the states (and their political subdivisions) governed family law and education. In such a regime, one would not expect
either level of government to have much interest in the measures of the
other.
After the New Deal, however, the old dual federalism regime of separate
state and federal spheres gave way to cooperative federalism structures, in
which state governments pervasively participate in the implementation of
45 Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851,
855 (2016).
46 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Check on Executive Authority: State Public Litigation, Executive Authority, and Political Polarization, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305 (2017–2018).
47 Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
48 Id. at 607–08.
49 See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8, 24–25 (Valerie Earle ed., 1968); see also ANTHONY J. BELLIA
JR., FEDERALISM 183 (2011) (“The dual federalism paradigm understands federal and state
governments to operate in different spheres of authority.”); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing
of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).
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federal law.50 Under the Clean Air Act, for example, Congress establishes
the basic parameters for air pollution regulation, but it delegates authority to
the EPA to identify dangerous pollutants and establish acceptable levels. It
also delegates authority to states, however, to develop and enforce implementation plans to achieve those federally mandated levels of pollution.51 This
sort of arrangement appears over and over again across the broad sweep of
federal regulatory and benefit programs. At the same time that broad constructions of Congress’s enumerated powers eliminated the states’ exclusive
authority over their old sphere, then, the states gained a key role in the
administration of federal programs.52
Under cooperative federalism, state officials are intimately and pervasively involved in federal policy. As Professor Heather Gerken has explained,
“[t]he policymaking space in which [state officials] wield power is not [a]
separate regulatory carve-out . . . . Instead, state policymakers wield power in
the nooks and crannies of the [federal] administrative system.”53 This relationship creates “concrete governance interests that flow from this modernday shared sovereignty.”54 When federal policy shifts, state officials will often
have to alter their own policies and practices in response. Sometimes, as with
Massachusetts and the contraceptive mandate, federal policy changes will
effectively shift costs to state governments. In other situations, state officials
may bear the brunt of political backlash against the new federal approach.
Or the federal policy shift may simply create additional work for state officials. In each of these situations, the burden falling on the states is comparable to injuries held sufficient to create standing for private entities.55
50 See, e.g., Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal
System, in A NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 1, 1–2 (Robert A.
Goldwin ed., 1961); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001).
51 See generally John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183 (1995).
52 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual Federalism, in
NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34, 44–46, 53–57 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T.
Levy eds., 2014).
53 Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2012)
(footnote omitted).
54 Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 642 (2016). Professors Woolhandler and Collins urge
that “[a] party who implements regulations . . . is not generally thought of as a proper
plaintiff to challenge policies for implementing the law,” but they cite only cases holding
that federal officials cannot challenge federal policy. Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra
note 5, at 2025 n.55. A central point of the cooperative federalism literature is that state
implementation is different because state officials do not work for the federal government.
See Gerken, supra note 53, at 1560; Ernest Young, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83
U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 1075 (2015). See generally JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 168–212 (2009).
55 See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 154–55 (2010) (finding adequate injury in
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Not all areas are governed by cooperative federalism regimes, of course.
Immigration, for example, has long been thought to be a national concern,56
and state governments generally are not tasked with implementing federal
immigration policy in the same way that they implement, say, the Clean Air
Act.57 But state and local governments nonetheless share responsibility for
dealing with immigrants in myriad ways; once immigrants arrive, states and
localities must police them, educate their children, and determine their eligibility for government benefits like driver’s licenses, in-state college tuition,
and welfare benefits. Moreover, state regulation affects the attractiveness of
immigration indirectly yet powerfully by, for example, controlling immigrants’ access to employment and public benefits.58
Likewise, federal and state criminal law are nominally administered by
separate and independent enforcement agencies. But as a practical matter
these agencies are highly integrated, with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agents cooperating on joint investigations and task forces; state
and local prosecutors referring cases to federal prosecutors; and state criminal convictions serving as a critical ingredient in federal sentencing decisions.59 In certain areas, such as marijuana enforcement, the dependence of
federal legal regimes upon state cooperative enforcement has become all too
evident as states decide no longer to pursue parallel objectives.60 These
examples demonstrate that even outside of classic cooperative federalism

farmers’ need to take costly precautions to protect their crops from genetically modified
alfalfa planted by neighboring farm); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21
(1998) (holding that plaintiffs’ inability to obtain information about donors supporting
their political opponents was sufficient injury for standing).
56 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). But see Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 575–80 (2008) (arguing
that this “[c]onventional [w]isdom” is incorrect).
57 Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act does authorize states and
localities to enter into agreements with federal officials delegating certain kinds of enforcement authority. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); Rodriguez, supra note 56, at 591. That program
has had very mixed results. Currently, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
website reports “agreements with 78 law enforcement agencies in 20 states.” Delegation of
Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Aug. 10, 2018).
58 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011) (holding that federal law did not preempt an Arizona statute penalizing businesses that hire
undocumented aliens).
59 See, e.g., Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (examining when a state
conviction qualifies to enhance federal penalties under the Armed Career Criminal Act);
Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and
Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1995); Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug
Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 815–20 (2004).
60 See Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 782 (2015).
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regimes, the operation of state law is frequently structured around, and crucially affected by, the operation of federal legal regimes.61
To the extent that the “terms under which [the state] participates in the
federal system” emphasized in Snapp are now defined by cooperative federalism models,62 legitimate state interests will be impacted, perhaps adversely,
by changes in federal policy. For that reason, I disagree with Tara Grove’s
insistence that “[s]tates do not have a special interest in the manner in which
the federal executive enforces federal law.”63 Where states partner with federal officials to enforce federal regulatory schemes, they will often have a
unique interest in the legality of federal alterations to those schemes or
actions taken pursuant to them. That interest is special in the sense that
states have it precisely because of their governmental role as participants in
federal regulation, but it is soundly analogous to the interest that one business partner has in the conduct of another.
Professor Grove suggests that the states’ standing should be limited to
situations in which federal action bears on their capacity to exercise self-government.64 “[I]t is hard to see,” she writes, “how States have a special interest—over and above that of private parties, localities, or even Congress
itself—in the federal executive’s compliance with federal statutes.”65 But the
recent work of Heather Gerken, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, and others has
demonstrated that one important way states exercise self-government within
our contemporary legal landscape is through their participation in the implementation of federal law.66
To be sure, recognizing the states’ stake in federal regulation will give
rise to cognizable injuries in a wide range of cases. In the Texas immigration
case, for instance, the United States worried that, on this sort of theory, any
state that incorporated the federal definition of taxable income into its own
income tax scheme—which nearly every state with an income tax does—
would have standing to challenge any change in federal tax policy that
61 Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 163 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that Texas fell
within the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act because “Texas seeks to
participate in notice and comment before the Secretary changes the immigration classification of millions of illegal aliens in a way that forces the state to the Hobson’s choice of
spending millions of dollars to subsidize driver’s licenses or changing its statutes”), aff’d per
curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
62 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982).
63 Grove, supra note 45, at 855.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966);
NUGENT, supra note 54, at 116–17; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–80 (2009) (describing states’ ability to exercise selfgovernment within the context of implementing federal law); Gerken, supra note 53, at
1557 (“States do not rule separate and apart from the system . . . . [T]hey serve as part of a
complex amalgam of national, state, and local actors implementing federal policy.”); Larry
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1542–46 (1994).
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altered that definition and thereby lowered state tax receipts.67 It is true that
any such state would have a concrete injury in fact. But to say as much is
hardly to say that states will have a meaningful right to block every change to
federal tax policy.68 They would need a viable cause of action to challenge
such changes, plausible claims that the changes were illegal, and a good argument that the rights the changes were alleged to violate extended to states as
well as to taxpayers. Not every unappealing category of lawsuit need be foreclosed at the standing stage; there are many other ways to weed out undesirable and nonmeritorious claims.
The end of dual federalism and the rise of cooperative models undermine arguments based on traditional limits on state litigation that were
hashed out in a period when the states and the national government had a
very different relationship.69 State public-law litigation thus seems particularly appropriate to challenge unlawful federal action implicating the states’
own participation in federal regulatory schemes. As Professor Shannon
Roesler has noted, “[i]t makes little sense to look to early Supreme Court
decisions analyzing federal-state conflicts regarding lawmaking authority in
an age when states and local governments are intimately involved in the
implementation and enforcement of federal law.”70 Because states no longer
enjoy exclusive policy domains of their own, and because they are pervasively
involved in implementing federal policy, states have important interests in
participating in federal policy debates. That entails an interest in how federal
law is made—in particular, in whether federal lawmaking respects legislative
and administrative processes that afford states an opportunity for input. Put
67 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 161 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
68 And states probably should have standing to contest at least some changes to tax
policy. I am not enamored by the various substantive claims that have been advanced to
challenge recent changes to the deductibility of state taxes on taxpayers’ federal returns,
but I do expect states ought to have standing to challenge those changes. We will significantly distort standing doctrine if we give up on the merits as an important means of disposing of bad claims.
69 See Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2028 (suggesting that because it
is difficult to limit state standing under contemporary doctrine, “it may be necessary to
resort to older versions of when states had litigable cases in the Article III courts”). Professors Woolhandler and Collins’s best case is Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77
(1867), which foreclosed Georgia from challenging the constitutionality of Reconstruction
based on injuries to its “rights of sovereignty.” That confusing opinion reads more like a
political question than a standing case. See id. (observing that Georgia’s claims “call for the
judgment of the court upon political questions”); see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting
Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 88 [hereinafter Bickel, Voting Rights] (describing Stanton as “sui generis—a political question case”). And in any event, the Court’s refusal to
enjoin the Union Army from carrying out the Reconstruction Acts in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War hardly seems like an apt guide to whether a state should be able to
challenge a change to workaday federal agency rules within the modern administrative
state.
70 Roesler, supra note 54, at 641.
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simply, states have legitimate interests in policing not only the constitutional
and statutory rules of federalism but also those of separation of powers.
Most obviously, states participate in federal policy debates through their
congressional representatives.71 The Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence has long acknowledged that “the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure
of the Federal Government itself”—particularly the representation of the
states in Congress.72 The Court has given life to these “political safeguards”
of federalism by insisting that Congress make the crucial decisions that affect
important state interests.73 Whether or not these political safeguards are sufficient to obviate the need for judicial enforcement of other constitutional
limits on national authority, doctrines protecting Congress’s role have been
critical to sustaining our federal structure.74
It is thus crucial that states have standing to complain when the Executive cuts Congress—and therefore states’ representation in that body—out of
the loop. Such claims have become common in recent years, as political
polarization tends to lead to legislative gridlock, encouraging both Republican and Democratic Presidents to press their goals through unilateral
action.75 Separation of powers claims, like Texas’s in the immigration case—
that the President violated the Take Care Clause by acting unilaterally without congressional authorization—are thus particularly appropriate for states
to assert.76 The United States cannot plausibly argue that disputes over federal policy should be deferred to political resolution when the national Executive has circumvented that very political process in which states would
otherwise have been represented.
States’ legitimate separation of powers concerns are not limited to
national actions lacking statutory authorization altogether. Congress has delegated significant authority to executive agencies, and the primary check on
executive action pursuant to such delegations is judicial review that assesses
71 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 311–12 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954).
72 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (acknowledging the national government’s broad enumerated powers and suggesting that within their bounds, “[t]he wisdom
and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are . . . the sole restraints” (emphasis added)).
73 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (“[I]nasmuch as this Court in
Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that
Congress intended such an exercise.”); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard
of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (2001).
74 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1350–52 (2001).
75 See Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 62–63.
76 See Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note *, at 29–31.
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the consistency of agency action with congressional command.77 Hence, it is
critical that states remain able to assert precisely the sort of statutory claim
that—to take just one example—Massachusetts asserted in the contraceptive
mandate case: that the agency has exceeded the scope of its mandate under
the law that Congress wrote.78 Without this safeguard, states would be critically “excluded from the benefits that are to flow from participation in the
federal system.”79
Substantive review under the APA, however, is an incomplete protection
for states in contemporary American policymaking. Given the broad terms of
modern federal statutes, the most important “legislative” battles involve the
sorts of rulemaking proceedings at issue in the Massachusetts contraception
case. The APA’s notice-and-comment requirement—as well as the opportunity to sue when that right is denied—affords state governments their own
independent voice in federal policymaking analogous to their constitutionally mandated representation in national legislation. As Daniel Francis has
observed:
[I]ndependence of voice may be particularly useful when the levels of government exhibit significant interdependence of action. In modern America,
state institutions and officials are deeply enmeshed in federal programs:
state officials administer federal programs, enforce federal law, and interpret
federal norms, formally subject in all cases to federal decisionmakers.80

Given the cooperative structure of most federal regulatory programs, it would
be difficult to identify any class of entities more pervasively enmeshed in and
affected by changes in federal regulations than state governments. States
must have a voice in that process before rules become finalized. It is thus no
surprise that so many lawsuits brought by state governments challenging federal action involve notice-and-comment claims under the APA.
The world in which states and state interests could stand apart from the
workings of the national government died, if it ever existed, at the New Deal.
The post–dual federalism world, with its concurrent regulatory jurisdiction
and cooperative regulatory structure, poses daunting challenges for state
77

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGUSTATE 143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable in light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution,
have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure
agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued.”); Stuart Minor Benjamin
& Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
DUKE L.J. 2111, 2130–41 (2008) (arguing that agency action is legitimate only to the extent
it can be grounded in congressional mandates).
78 See generally Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A ReExamination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1094–1103 (1977).
79 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 608 (1982).
80 Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political Safeguard of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023,
1050 (2017); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 537 (2011)
(“[E]very branch of state government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing,
and interpreting federal statutory law.”).

LATORY

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL502.txt

1910

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

16-JUL-19

7:54

[vol. 94:5

autonomy, but its governing structures of legislative representation, bureaucratic cooperation, and access to agency deliberations provide opportunities
for states to exercise continuing influence. States have a unique and legitimate stake in judicial action reviewing the legality of national action within
this modern framework.81
II. SHOULD STATES FACE UNIQUE IMPEDIMENTS

TO

STANDING?

Broad assertions of state standing to challenge national policy have been
met with considerable skepticism. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Department of
Justice has hardly embraced the notion, instead advancing a number of novel
arguments against state standing to sue. The considerable pushback in the
academy is somewhat harder to explain, especially given the earlier standing
literature’s tendency to criticize restriction on standing. State public-law suits
challenging national policy became especially salient during the Obama
administration, when “red” states challenged the Affordable Care Act, the
Clean Power Plan, and the DAPA policy on immigration, and it is possible
that the academy’s general approval of those policies drove its skepticism of
the lawsuits challenging them. The political valence of state litigation has
evened out very quickly, however, with prominent state lawsuits challenging a
wide variety of Trump administration policies.82
The United States has opposed state standing in suits challenging
national policy by developing doctrinal arguments that, while stated in general terms, are practically speaking unique to state plaintiffs. The Justice
Department has argued, for example, that when a state’s costs arise from the
interaction of the challenged federal action with some aspect of extant state
law, the state’s injury is “self-inflicted.”83 It has also contended that because
the challenged federal programs will benefit the state in some way, the state
lacks standing if those benefits exceed the costs to the state.84 Finally, the
Justice Department sometimes argues that state governments fall outside the
zone of interests of the laws under which they challenge federal action—in
particular, the APA.85
It is hard to take these arguments at face value because they would radically eliminate standing for private litigants in very traditional sorts of cases if
applied to litigants across the board. The subtext of the doctrinal arguments
is thus a claim of constitutional policy, if you will—that is, that state governmental challenges to national policy are generally inappropriate, and that
the doctrine must be manipulated to prevent them. The reason given is gen81 See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L.
REV. 2051, 2100 (2011) (“[S]overeign state standing provides an important means by
which states can claim their rightful position in the American constitutional scheme.”).
82 See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 85–95 (discussing the relationship
between partisan polarization and state litigation).
83 See infra Section II.A.
84 See infra Section II.B.
85 Brief for the Petitioners at 33–36, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(No. 15-674).
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erally that state challenges to federal policy raise inherently “political” issues
that should be worked out in the political process rather than in court. In
this, the arguments asserted by lawyers for the United States echo the concerns expressed by many academics.86
This Section surveys both the particular doctrinal objections to state governmental standing and the more general concern that state litigation is
inherently political. My discussion presupposes that standing doctrine is its
own set of rules that aspire to internal coherence. Even if one were convinced that state governmental challenges to national policy were pernicious
in their impact on the body politic, one should hesitate to pour out such
cases on grounds that cannot be defended as principled in general terms.87
A. Self-Inflicted Injury
In the Texas immigration litigation, the Justice Department argued that
Texas’s costs incurred processing DAPA beneficiaries’ driver’s license applications were self-inflicted because it was Texas’s own law that enabled all persons legally present in the state to make such an application.88 The
Department of Justice made a similar argument in the Massachusetts contraceptive mandate litigation.89 The lower courts rejected this argument in the
Texas case and have so far not relied upon it in the Massachusetts litigation.90 But the self-inflicted injury argument aptly captures the Justice
86 This concern has been around for a long time. See, e.g., Bickel, Voting Rights, supra
note 69, at 89–90. And it is no coincidence that Professor Bickel argued for special restrictions on state standing at roughly the same time that he contended more generally that
courts should manipulate justiciability doctrines to avoid deciding controversial cases. See
Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
87 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
88 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 85, at 24–29. One reason not to take the
Justice Department’s argument on this point too seriously is that, at roughly the same time,
it had persuaded the Ninth Circuit that the federal immigration laws preempted any restrictions that a state might choose to impose on eligibility for driver’s licenses. See United
States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 8, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v.
Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 15-15307) (arguing that because federal power
over immigration is exclusive, “a State generally may not establish classifications that distinguish among aliens whom the federal government has treated similarly”); see also Ariz.
Dream Act Coal., 757 F.3d at 1063–65 (holding that both the Equal Protection Clause and
federal preemption precluded Arizona from “target[ing] DACA recipients for disparate
treatment”).
89 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–13,
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 301 F. Supp. 3d 248 (D. Mass. 2018)
(No. 17-11930).
90 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F. Supp. 3d 248 (D.
Mass. 2018), vacated, 923 F.3d 209 (1st Cir. 2019); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 619 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). Judge Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit, however, did rely exclu-
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Department’s considered disregard of the way its policies interact with state
law. The notion that states should have to alter their own laws in order to
avoid deleterious impacts of federal policy, even if those federal policies are
unlawful, seems uniquely designed to disrupt the structure of contemporary
cooperative federalism arrangements. For that reason, it is worth considering the argument at some length.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to recognizing a doctrine of
self-inflicted injury was in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,91 which held,
inter alia, that the costs a plaintiff may incur to avoid the impact of a federal
policy may not themselves constitute the sort of injury in fact needed to challenge that policy.92 The Clapper plaintiffs challenged aspects of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that authorized surveillance of certain
individuals outside the United States.93 The plaintiffs—who claimed to
engage in communications with persons subject to FISA surveillance—could
not demonstrate that they had, in fact, been subjected to any FISA surveillance; instead, they relied on the costs they had incurred to avoid the possibility of such surveillance to establish their injury.94 Because these costs
arose from the plaintiffs’ concerns that they might be subjected to surveillance, the Court held that “respondents’ self-inflicted injuries are not fairly
traceable to the Government’s purported activities . . . and their subjective
fear of surveillance does not give rise to standing.”95
Clapper holds, at most, that plaintiffs who cannot show they are even
subject to a government policy cannot manufacture injury in fact by voluntarily expending resources in anticipation of being subject to that policy. That
is a problem when one is challenging a secret surveillance program, but it
will not fit the vast majority of state lawsuits against national policy. In the
immigration case, for instance, the United States did not dispute that DAPA
would apply to persons in Texas and, as a result, affect the operation of
Texas’s own governmental operations.96 Clapper, moreover, must be read in
conjunction with other cases recognizing standing based on injuries that
might also be characterized as self-inflicted. In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms,97 for example, the Court held that conventional alfalfa farmers had
standing to challenge a federal agency’s decision to deregulate genetically
engineered alfalfa.98 Although it was uncertain whether the genetically engineered alfalfa would in fact infect nearby conventional alfalfa farms, the
sively upon this argument to urge that California lacked standing to challenge the new
contraceptive mandate rules. See California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 585–88 (9th Cir. 2018)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
91 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
92 See id. at 415–18, 422.
93 Id. at 401.
94 See id. at 407.
95 Id. at 418.
96 See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616–22 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 787 F.3d
733 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
97 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
98 See id.
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plaintiffs undertook costly precautions against such infection.99 The Court
concluded that “[s]uch harms, which respondents will suffer even if their
crops are not actually infected with the Roundup Ready gene, are sufficiently
concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional standing analysis.”100 If there were a general rule against self-inflicted injuries, then surely
Monsanto would have come out the other way.101
Understandably, the United States has not relied primarily on Clapper
(and generally does not mention Monsanto). Instead, its best case is Pennsylvania v. New Jersey.102 That case considered two separate motions for leave
to file complaints in this Court’s original jurisdiction concerning taxation by
one state that allegedly injured other states.103 The entirety of the relevant
discussion in the Court’s opinion is as follows:
In neither of the suits at bar has the defendant State inflicted any injury
upon the plaintiff States through the imposition of the taxes held, in No. 69,
and alleged, in No. 68, to be unconstitutional. The injuries to the plaintiffs’
fiscs were self-inflicted, resulting from decisions by their respective state legislatures. Nothing required Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont to extend a
tax credit to their residents for income taxes paid to New Hampshire, and
nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to
New Jersey. No State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its
own hand.104

This cursory discussion is the rock upon which the United States has
rested its self-inflicted injury argument, but Pennsylvania cannot bear the
weight. The case did not concern Article III standing at all, but rather the
Supreme Court’s standard for exercising its original jurisdiction.105 In Mississippi v. Louisiana,106 the Court explained that
[r]ecognizing the “delicate and grave” character of our original jurisdiction,
we have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) as making our
99 See id. at 154–55.
100 Id. at 155.
101 Clapper distinguished Monsanto on the ground that the Farmers presented “concrete
evidence to substantiate their fears,” as opposed to “mere conjecture about possible governmental actions.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 420 (2013). This confirms that the problem in Clapper was rooted in the uncertainty that the challenged
government action would ever apply to the plaintiffs, thus rendering their precautionary
expenditures not only self-inflicted but superfluous. In any event, given the evidentiary
record and the district court findings here, the present case is much closer to Monsanto
than Clapper.
102 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam); see also, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, supra note
85, at 25 (“Pennsylvania controls.”).
103 See Pennsylvania, 462 U.S. at 661.
104 Id. at 664.
105 For one thing, the only use of the term “standing” in the opinion occurs in the
Court’s later discussion of Pennsylvania’s additional parens patriae claim on behalf of its
citizens. Id. at 660. The Court rejected that claim based on other grounds having nothing
to do with self-inflicted injury, and the United States has not relied on that part of the
opinion. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 85.
106 506 U.S. 73 (1992).
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original jurisdiction “obligatory only in appropriate cases,” and as providing
us “with substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of an original forum in this Court.”107

One criterion for the exercise of jurisdiction is that “it must appear that
the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other
State,”108 and it is evidently this requirement that concerned the Court in
Pennsylvania. Certainly there is conceptual overlap between this requirement
and Article III injury in fact, but the original jurisdiction cases do not invoke
Article III and there is no reason to believe that the standards are the
same.109 As the Wright and Miller treatise puts it, “[t]he special concerns
that have guided the Court in this area [original jurisdiction] are unique to
its own jurisdictional problems, and do not provide a sure basis for analogous
reasoning in other areas of state standing.”110
In any event, the novel requirement proposed by the United States
would have radical implications for standing doctrine. The United States has
suggested that an injury is self-inflicted, and therefore unable to support
standing, any time it could have been avoided if the plaintiff had taken some
further action. That principle would have eliminated standing in any number of landmark decisions. Oliver Brown, the lead plaintiff in Brown v. Board
of Education,111 could have avoided the injury of segregation by homeschooling his daughter. Jane Roe112 could have gone to a state where abortion was
legal, or simply not gotten pregnant in the first place. No one thinks these
are good arguments against the standing of the plaintiffs in those cases.
Because the laws in question were unconstitutional, the plaintiffs were not
required to alter their affairs in order to avoid them. But that then raises the
question why self-inflicted injury should be a good argument against any
plaintiff—including a state.
The truth is that most injuries can be avoided by some action or other;
the question is whether the plaintiff could have so easily avoided its injury

107 Id. at 76 (citations omitted) (first quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 15 (1900);
then quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); and then quoting Texas
v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983)).
108 Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939).
109 The standard for whether the interest of the complaining state is sufficient to support the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is rather higher than the standard for Article III injury in fact. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 571 n.18 (“The model case
for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.”).
110 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11.1 (3d ed. 2018); see also California v. Azar, 911 F.3d
558, 574 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We question whether the holding of Pennsylvania applies
outside the specific requirements for the invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction.”).
111 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
112 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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that it lacks any real personal stake in the dispute.113 Certainly the justiciability rules do not categorically require the states to take evasive action at
all costs to avoid injury at the hands of federal law. When a state law has been
held invalid on federal constitutional grounds, for example, the state has
standing to appeal that judgment based on the injury that inheres in not
being able to enforce its law;114 no one says that this injury is self-inflicted
because the state did not have to enact its law in the first place. States are not
required to alter their legal regimes to accommodate changes in federal law
that injured them without first having the opportunity to challenge the validity of that federal change.115
B. Offsetting Benefits
A second genre of argument raised on occasion to contest state standing
concerns offsetting benefits of the challenged federal policy that arguably
cancel out the plaintiff state’s injury. In the Texas immigration case, for
instance, the Justice Department argued that immigration was good for the
Texas economy and that this benefit would offset the expense to the state of
processing DAPA beneficiaries’ driver’s license applications.116 Like the selfinflicted injury argument, this is a genre of standing argument that one generally does not encounter in public-law litigation involving other sorts of
plaintiffs. There are good reasons for that.
This sort of argument raises three problems. First, it will undermine
efforts to preserve standing as a threshold issue in federal litigation. In Gonzales v. Raich, for example, persons using marijuana for medicinal purposes
challenged Congress’s power to regulate marijuana under the Commerce
Clause.117 If offsetting benefits were relevant to standing, the United States
could have argued that marijuana is more detrimental than helpful to health
and that, therefore, Angel Raich had no cognizable injury. But, of course, no
one tried to make this argument. And if they had, the courts would have had
to postpone resolution of the standing issue until trial, at which time evidence could have been presented to resolve disputes about the health effects
of marijuana.
Or consider a hypothetical suit—similar to many actual cases—challenging an agency’s failure to issue an environmental impact statement prior to
113 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (observing that “the standing
question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged . . . a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
114 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting a state government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidating a state law because “a State clearly has a legitimate
interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”).
115 See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982) (recognizing a state’s “sovereign interest[ ]” in “the power to create and enforce a
legal code”).
116 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by
an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
117 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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building a dam or a highway. Such a failure would ordinarily be challenged
by persons whose property interests are harmed by the project, and the government does not ordinarily argue—for standing purposes—that the economic benefits of the project outweigh those injuries. In cases where the
plaintiffs’ claims turned on the reasonableness of the government action or
the elimination of the relevant property rights, an effort to assess offsetting
benefits would frequently overlap substantially with the claims on the merits.
Certainly an offsetting benefits inquiry would make it nearly impossible to
resolve standing at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage, as that
sort of argument will nearly always implicate factual disputes.
Second, often claims of offsetting benefits will require courts to resolve
conflicts between incommensurable values. Part of the harm in this case, for
example, is that changes to immigration laws that the plaintiff states support
have been made through a unilateral executive action that circumvented the
states’ representation in Congress. Does the possibility that the plaintiff
states might save some money on net outweigh the infringement of the constitutional and democratic principles they assert? Likewise, nature lovers
challenging the construction of a road through a pristine forest might be
unpersuaded that the offsetting benefits of the road outweigh any injury to
their aesthetic preferences. It is unclear how a court would even begin to
make these sorts of assessments.
Finally, any sort of “offset” argument is particularly inappropriate with
respect to a claim by a state government. Whether the benefits of increased
immigration are likely to outweigh the costs, for example, is a policy judgment, and the duly elected policy organs of the twenty-six States who challenged the DAPA policy had made the judgment they do not.118 This is
exactly the sort of judgment that—in other contexts—receives nearly conclusive deference.119 Preventing state governments from acting on their judgment is itself a legal injury, and that constraint can be sustained only if the
challenged national government turns out to be valid on the merits. There is
no warrant in standing doctrine, however, for second-guessing the states’ policy judgments at the threshold.
C. Politics and the Public Interest
These arguments against states’ standing are so unpersuasive on their
own merits that, to get even the limited traction they have gotten in state
public litigation, they must be driven by some more deep-seated anxiety
about state litigation. Similarly, much of the academic commentary seems to
118 Whether the initial judgment to join the suit is made by a state legislature, governor,
or attorney general is irrelevant, given that state legislatures have means to control state
litigation decisions and state executive officials are electorally accountable in their own
right.
119 Cf. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Under traditional rational
basis analysis . . . [t]he key principle is the deference to legislative policy decisions embodied in courts’ reluctance to judge the wisdom, fairness, logic or desirability of those
choices.”).
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start with the conclusion that we don’t like states as litigants, then reason
backward to doctrines that might exclude them.120 The underlying anxiety
seems to be twofold. The first concern seems to be that the states are inappropriately usurping the role of protecting the public interest in areas like
immigration, environmental policy, or healthcare where national law is now
primary. That role, critics suggest, belongs to the national government.121
The second, not unrelated concern is that state public lawsuits like the Texas
immigration litigation or the “blue” state challenges to the Trump administration’s travel bans raise highly politicized issues that should be resolved
outside of court.
These concerns are worth taking seriously, but they are ultimately unpersuasive. Take the public interest first. The American Constitution divides
sovereignty between two levels of government; as Justice Kennedy famously
said, the American Founders “split the atom of sovereignty.”122 Although
Americans have debated the true meaning of that division for over two centuries, one strong implication is that no particular unit of government can
claim a monopoly on the public interest. The national government speaks
for that interest when it exercises its constitutional functions, but it is equally
clear that state governments also speak for the public interest when exercising their constitutional functions.
One might accept this much and still insist that responsibility for the
public interest is strictly divided between the national and state governments.
That, for instance, seems to be the assumption underlying the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon.123 That case rejected Massachusetts’s standing to sue parens patriae—that is, on behalf of its citizens—to challenge the
operation of a federal statute. The Court said that
it is no part of [Massachusetts’s] duty or power to enforce [its citizens’]
rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that
field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as
parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the
former, and not the latter, they must look for such protective measures as
flow from that status.124

This language certainly seems to suggest that the national government must
determine the public interest where national law is concerned. As Professor
Alexander Bickel put it, “the national government is fully in privity with the
people it governs, and needs, and should brook, no intermediaries.”125
And yet our contemporary federalism defies that simple division of
labor. The Court decided Mellon in the heyday of dual federalism, just five
120 See, e.g., Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2015–16.
121 See, e.g., Bickel, Voting Rights, supra note 69, at 89.
122 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
123 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
124 Id. at 485–86.
125 See also Bickel, Voting Rights, supra note 69, at 89.
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years after Hammer v. Dagenhart126 and a decade and a half before the 1937
“switch in time” that ushered in an age of concurrent federal and state regulatory responsibilities. As I have already discussed, the state and national governments now share jurisdiction over the same policy space, and their efforts
are frequently combined into integrated cooperative federalism schemes like
the Clean Air Act. To appropriate Professor Bickel’s language, the modern
national government “needs, and [must] brook, [lots of] intermediaries.”127
To be sure, our system generally provides that federal authorities have
the last word within this realm, but only so far as they are acting within their
legal authority. What the New Deal revolution certainly ended is the notion
of two parallel spheres of state and national regulation, with two parallel conceptions of the public interest. We have in this sense come full circle to the
Federalists’ conception of federalism, in which the two levels’ shared responsibility for the public interest allows Americans to turn to one level of government when the other overreaches.128
In any event, it is hard to see how this aspect of Mellon can survive the
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.129 There, the Court upheld the
States’ standing to sue the EPA for failing to carry out its responsibilities
under the Clean Air Act. 130 If federal authorities had a monopoly of the
public interest as embodied in that national act, then the States should not
have been allowed to pursue that claim. But of course the States were allowed
to pursue that claim. As Justice Stevens explained for the majority, “there is a
critical difference between allowing a State ‘to protect her citizens from the
operation of federal statutes’ (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a
State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).”131
So long as they can meet the traditional criteria for standing, states may sue
to vindicate the public interest as they see it, even when in conflict with the
views of federal officials and even when their claims rest on federal law.
One might still worry, of course, that state public litigation will draw the
courts into highly politicized controversies that they would better avoid. That
is a core criticism advanced by Professor Dellinger,132 Grove,133 Woolhan126 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal child labor law on the ground that it
regulated intrastate activity and thus fell outside Congress’s enumerated purview), overruled
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
127 See text accompanying note 125.
128 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (“Power being almost always the rival of power; the General Government will at all
times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have
the same disposition towards the General Government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by
either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress.”).
129 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
130 Id. at 526.
131 Id. at 520 n.17 (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)).
132 See Dellinger Brief, supra note 7, at 3–4.
133 See Grove, supra note 45, at 855–56.
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dler, and Collins, for example.134 I do not wish to be read as taking this
critique lightly. In other work, Professor Margaret Lemos and I have worried
that the proliferation of state challenges to federal action under zealous state
attorneys general, like Texas’s Gregg Abbott or Massachusetts’s Maura Healey, might ultimately undermine the usefulness and legitimacy of such litigation.135 But these concerns about the politicization of state litigation must
be evaluated in a broader context. State litigation is one avenue for resolving
current disputes that combine a political and a legal dimension. We should
not imagine that, if that avenue is closed off, the underlying disputes will
simply go away. The crucial question is how state litigation compares with
other likely avenues for resolving such disputes. In particular, we should ask
how state litigation compares to public litigation brought by nonstate actors,
and how state litigation compares to the remedies that political actors may be
expected to employ outside the courts. In many circumstances, state litigation
will be preferable to both these alternatives.
Take other forms of public litigation first. Professors Woolhandler and
Collins want to return states “to their traditional disfavored status as plaintiffs” by “resort[ing] to older versions of when states had litigable cases in the
Article III courts.”136 Those rules adhered closely to a “private rights” model
of adjudication that restricted the exercise of judicial power to circumstances
that resembled, as closely as possible, traditional common-law suits between
private individuals.137 Much of the criticism of state standing seems
grounded in this model.138 But as public-law scholars have long noted, the
private rights model began to give ground to a “public rights”—or “law declaration”—model of litigation by the middle of the twentieth century.139 That
134 See Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2029–30; see also Bickel, Voting
Rights, supra note 69, at 89–90.
135 See Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 119–23.
136 Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2028; see also Bickel, Voting Rights,
supra note 69, at 89–90.
137 See Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2019. See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 73–74 (describing the “private right” or “dispute resolution”
model of adjudication).
138 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting) (worrying that by hearing state claims against the federal government, courts were
becoming “ombudsmen of the administrative bureaucracy” (quoting John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Comment, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L.J. 1219, 1232 (1993))), aff’d per
curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
139 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 74–75; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976). It would be a mistake, however,
to suppose that because much state litigation fits a broad “public rights” model of adjudication, there is an “absence of individual rights at stake.” Woolhandler & Collins, Reining,
supra note 5, at 2030. Many of these cases implicate interests of great importance to individuals, such as the right against discrimination in the travel ban cases or, in the contraceptive mandate cases, access to contraceptives and exercise of religious conscience. And even
when states litigate purely structural issues, the Supreme Court has made clear that structural principles “protect[ ] the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.” Bond v.
United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011).
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model “presupposes that federal courts . . . have a special function of enforcing the rule of law, independent of the task of resolving concrete disputes
over individual rights.”140 I have considerable sympathy with criticisms that
this model often overreaches the legitimate role of courts in the separation
of powers,141 but putting that genie back in the bottle would require far
more radical reforms than limiting state standing. As Robert Kagan memorably observed, the use of adjudication to hammer out and implement public
norms has become “the American way of law.”142
In our contemporary legal culture, barring states from litigating matters
like the travel bans or environmental policy is hardly likely to keep the courts
out of those controversies. Unless we also bar individuals and public interest
organizations from litigating claims in those areas, the courts will be drawn in
regardless. The question then becomes a comparative one: Are state governments better or worse litigants for such cases than the likely alternatives?
Critics of state standing have rarely addressed this “Compared to what?”
question.143
Professor Grove worries, for example, that state attorneys general will
pursue the interests of their own states with “little incentive to be mindful of
the national public interest in the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of federal law.”144 But other possible public-law plaintiffs may have their own parochialisms. No one thinks the Sierra Club necessarily speaks for all persons
concerned about the environment, or that the American Civil Liberties
Union speaks for all interested in constitutional rights—much less that these
sorts of advocacy groups speak for the entire “national public interest.” Our
legal system has generally sought to transcend the potentially narrow perspectives of particular litigants by providing opportunities for other voices as
intervenors and amici and by limiting the impact of individual judgments. In
any event, as I discuss further in Part III, there are reasons to think state
governments compare favorably to other public-law litigants.
The possibility remains, of course, that we should prefer “political” resolution of controversies over measures like the Obama immigration order or
the Trump travel ban.145 I have already noted that—in our litigation-saturated culture—the courts are likely to see these cases even if states do not
bring them, and most proponents of political resolution do not deny that
cases like the travel bans or the DAPA immigration order present justiciable
legal questions for decision. It is a mistake to view political and legal disputes
as mutually exclusive categories; in reality, they often overlap. But putting
140 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 74.
141 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 233 (2010).
142 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
143 See Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 105–23 (discussing this question in greater
depth).
144 Grove, supra note 45, at 896.
145 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845,
871–74 (2012).
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these reservations aside, I want to suggest that the virtues of purely political
resolution for such controversies have been exaggerated.
Recent years have seen frequent disputes between the states and the
national government and between the President and Congress. The contending sides in these disputes have often resorted to political remedies as an
alternative litigation. These political remedies include shutting down the
national government, refusing to raise the federal debt ceiling, congressional
attempts to defund ongoing military operations, and refusals to confirm
Executive officials or federal judges (or long delays in confirmation).
Overuse of these remedies threatens to significantly impede the political system’s ability to address current problems. The initial draft of this Essay went
to the law review amidst the longest government shutdown in history as the
President and Congress employed their political remedies in a battle over
President Trump’s border wall proposal.146 My colleague Professor Neil
Siegel has observed that “[i]n the United States today, the behavior of the
political branches is generally viewed as more damaging to the American
constitutional system than is the behavior of the federal courts.”147 A
rational observer might well view the judiciary as—to paraphrase Hamilton—
the least insane branch.148
None of this is to say that current standing rules should be relaxed, or
that states should be granted carte blanche access to the federal courts. The
point is simply that forcing quintessentially legal disputes—such as the statutory authorization for an executive program or that program’s compliance
with the APA—out of the judicial system has its own costs, and those costs
may be reaching a critical point. When states satisfy traditional requirements
for standing, either as directly injured parties or as parens patriae, the courts
should not further tighten those requirements on the assumption that political remedies are always preferable. It is no longer sufficient to intone that
“Article III courts do not exist to resolve the policy disputes between governments”149 without explaining why legal disputes cease to be legal when they
overlap with policy, or how a principle foreclosing interinstitutional litigation
can be derived from Article III.
III. “SPECIAL SOLICITUDE”

ADVANTAGES
LITIGATION

AND THE

OF

STATE PUBLIC

I have argued so far that states will frequently have standing to challenge
national action based on traditional standing principles, properly construed,
and that special restrictions on state litigation are hard to justify. The con146 See Jason Silverstein, Every Government Shutdown—and How Long They Lasted, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-the-longest-government-shutdown-every-government-shutdown-and-how-long-they-lasted/.
147 Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and
Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109, 109 (2018).
148 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (famously describing the judiciary as “the least dangerous” branch).
149 Woolhandler & Collins, Reining, supra note 5, at 2031.
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verse question remains, however: Should states have special advantages over
other litigants?150 What should we make of Massachusetts v. EPA’s suggestion
that states are “entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis”?151
I want to make two points about special solicitude. The first is that, to
the extent that it exists, it is unlikely to take the form that most discussions
seem to assume. Most discussions—including this one—focus on the nature
of the interests that states can assert as a predicate to standing in an Article
III court. But Massachusetts v. EPA’s analysis of that question rested on pretty
traditional interests: the Commonwealth’s proprietary interest as a landowner and the interests of its citizens that it could represent parens patriae.
Lack of a traditional interest, in other words, was not the hump that Massachusetts needed special solicitude to get over. That hump, rather, involved
the traceability and redressability elements of standing. Because climate
change arises from so many sources, foreign and domestic; because reductions in U.S. greenhouse gases are simply one factor among many in mitigating its impacts; and because the relationship between climate change and
particular impacts on, say, Cape Cod are extremely difficult to pin down, the
traceability and redressability elements in Massachusetts v. EPA were
extremely difficult. If Massachusetts got a break on account of being a state,
it was surely on that point.
The special solicitude element of Massachusetts v. EPA thus goes to a
somewhat lower-profile but very important debate in the Supreme Court’s
recent cases about probabilistic standing.152 Litigants have sought to address
uncertainty about where and with respect to whom a challenged activity’s
impacts will manifest by extending the sphere of the litigation—that is, by
employing devices like class actions or organizational standing to ensure that
the plaintiffs represent a broad enough group that some of them are sure to
be injured by the challenged conduct. But so far, the Court has been quite
skeptical of these attempts to overcome the probabilistic hurdle through
aggregation.153 Massachusetts v. EPA might be viewed as the first successful
attempt to do so. If that is right, it is probably because of my second point,
which is that states are a particularly attractive means of aggregating diffuse
claims.
One of the most difficult problems in federal practice and procedure
concerns the appropriate mechanisms for aggregating claims that affect large
numbers of people but that individual litigants lack the incentives or the
150 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Quasi-Sovereign Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1927
(2019) (arguing that they should).
151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
152 Compare, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 586 U.S. 398 (2013), with Monsanto Co.
v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
153 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (rejecting an attempt to
aggregate a large number of plaintiffs by way of a large membership organization in order
to challenge a U.S. Forest Service action of uncertain impact); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 (1984) (rejecting an attempt to cure a similar probability problem by use of a nationwide class action).
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wherewithal to pursue.154 Standing doctrine often creates or exacerbates the
aggregation problem. In the Texas immigration case, for example, the persons directly affected by DAPA were the unlawfully present aliens granted
legal presence by its terms.155 Those persons, of course, were unlikely to
challenge the program. But the natural persons arguably injured by DAPA—
the voters whose representatives voted for the federal statutes that DAPA
arguably transgresses, the federal and state taxpayers whose resources will be
diverted to pay DAPA’s significant expenses, or state citizens who may suffer a
general deterioration in public services if those services are burdened by new
entrants—lack individual standing under settled law because their interests
are too diffuse.
Our law has adopted a number of solutions—such as class actions, multidistrict litigation, or organizational standing—as a means of aggregating
claims that are impracticable to bring on an individual basis. For that reason,
it is illusory to suppose that traditional suits by individuals are the most likely
alternative to state litigation. But these aggregate mechanisms all have their
problems, and none addresses the lack of individual standing when injuries
occur to truly diffuse public interests. State litigation has been recognized as
another potential solution to this aggregation problem,156 and it may well be
preferable to the alternatives in certain respects.157 After all, states are
empowered by state constitutions and the Tenth Amendment to represent
the diffuse public interest of their citizens.158
One significant advantage that states have over private organizations and
class actions is that they have built-in mechanisms of democratic accountability for their conduct of litigation on behalf of their citizens.159 Justices of the
Supreme Court have complained that the use of “private attorneys general”
154 See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 109.
155 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
156 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) (identifying parens patriae actions by state governments as a form
of representative litigation similar to class actions or suits by bankruptcy trustees); Lemos &
Young, supra note 16, at 109–13.
157 See generally Crocker, Organizational Account, supra note 42 (comparing states to
organizational litigants).
158 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 150, at 1935–43 (exploring state authority to protect the
public interest); James Tierney, Several Significant Bipartisan Multistate Settlements that the
Media Is Barely Covering, STATEAG.ORG: TIERNEY BLOG (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.stateag
.org/tierney-blog/2019/1/7/several-significant-bipartisan-mutistate-settlements-that-themedia-is-barely-covering (“At a time when the federal government literally has shut down,
and when the media proclaims that partisanship is at an all-time high, state attorneys general continue to do extraordinary work on behalf of the public interest.”). The website
stateAG.org, founded by James Tierney, the prominent former attorney general of Maine,
offers an invaluable sampling of the activities of state attorneys general. See STATEAG.ORG,
https://www.stateag.org/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
159 See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 113–17; Bradford Mank, Should States
Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test
for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1784 (2008) (discussing checks on state litigation);
Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 279 (2009).
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to enforce federal law raises significant problems of public accountability,
and similar concerns have been raised about the accountability of class counsel in class actions.160 State officials who sue on behalf of their citizens are
politically accountable for their actions, however. Recent attorney-general
elections in Texas and Florida, for example, have featured public debate
about the appropriateness of state participation in litigation challenging the
Affordable Care Act.161
More generally, litigation by states fits well into a constitutional system
predicated on the notion that no one person or institution can lay a unique
claim to the public interest. Our system of both vertical and horizontal
checks and balances recognizes that the public benefits when multiple institutions can step in if a particular officer or agency fails to pursue the public
welfare or respect legal constraints.162 Even in an area of strong national
interest like immigration, the national Executive is not, and cannot be, judge
in its own case. By according special solicitude to states’ standing, Massachusetts v. EPA facilitated states’ valuable role in the process by which every political institution is held accountable to the rule of law.
There are no guarantees, of course, that this role will not be abused.
Although litigation by both red and blue states under the past two presidential administrations has made valuable contributions, it is hard not to look at
the overall proliferation of state lawsuits with concern.163 But this proliferation is hardly confined to state litigation, and it seems to be largely a symptom of broader maladies of polarized politics and, perhaps, an excess of
adversarial legalism generally. It remains possible that the political and institutional checks on state litigation will, in time, return the system to a more
satisfactory equilibrium. And it is worth remembering that those checks are
considerably more substantial with respect to state litigation than elsewhere
in public law.
CONCLUSION
Our federal system at the dawn of the twenty-first century is quite different from the one envisioned by the Founders. And yet for all the Founders’
160 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing private attorneys general); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting concern about lack of
accountability of class counsel).
161 See Chuck Lindell, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott Opposes Federal Government on
Many Fronts, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Sept. 1, 2012), https://www.statesman.com/article/
20120901/NEWS/309012625; Jim Turner, AG Candidates Shaw, Moody Square Off over
Obamacare, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.heraldtribune.com/
news/20180907/ag-candidates-shaw-moody-square-off-over-obamacare.
162 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 128, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (observing
that “the General Government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the
state governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the General
Government”).
163 See Lemos & Young, supra note 16, at 121–23 (worrying).
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emphasis on enumerated powers and separate spheres of national and state
activity, they also plainly envisioned a world in which states would both act in
harness with national authorities and contest national actions that might be
illegitimate. That world is still very much with us. And because so much of
national policy and national controversy is driven by law and fought out in
court, state public-law litigation has become a critical means by which states
participate in the federal system. And because state litigants are both competent and accountable, they have the potential to play a unique and positive
role in our broader system of public law.
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